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This article presents the findings of a case study examining the role of the regulator in 
facilitating Privacy by Design (“PbD”) solutions. With the introduction of PbD into 
the new European Union General Data Protection Regulation, it is important to 
understand the conditions under which PbD can succeed and the role which regulators 
can play (if at all) in promoting such success. Two initiatives with similar technology 
are examined: first, a PbD success, the introduction of facial recognition technology 
into existing cameras in casinos in Ontario, and second, a PbD failure, the expanded 
deployment of cameras within the public transit system of Toronto. The findings are 
organized into three overarching themes: PbD-focused findings, leadership and 
organizational findings, and regulator-focused findings. The article argues that privacy 
continues to persist as an engineering problem despite PbD, that (related to that) there is 
growing recognition of privacy as an issue of organizational change and leadership, and 
consequently, that the role of the regulator must evolve if PbD is to become a meaningful 
regulatory tool, an evolution that carries with it both risks and opportunities for privacy.
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I. Introduction
This paper presents the findings of a case study examining the role of the regulator in facilitating Privacy by Design solutions. PbD is an 
approach to privacy which urges organizations to design privacy into new 
initiatives rather than deal with privacy as an after-the-fact “problem”. 
The approach has been embraced by many, but executed by few, for a 
number of reasons, such as the difficulty in translating the idea of PbD 
into engineering algorithms. With the introduction of PbD into the new 
European Union General Data Protection Regulation1 (“GDPR”), it is 
important to understand the conditions under which PbD can succeed, 
and the role regulators can play (if at all) in promoting such success.
This case study contributes to this understanding by examining 
the Province of Ontario, Canada, and the role of its Information and 
Privacy Commissioner in two PbD initiatives. Ontario was not chosen at 
random. Its Privacy Commissioner at the time the initiatives were taking 
place, Dr. Ann Cavoukian, was a champion of PbD. Cavoukian tirelessly 
and passionately promoted PbD both domestically and internationally, 
and outcomes such as the 2010 Jerusalem Declaration of Privacy 
Commissioners in support of PbD and the inclusion of PbD in the new 
GDPR can largely be attributed to her advocacy.
This case study wishes to examine the role the Commissioner played 
as a regulator and whether the conduct of the regulator had any bearing 
on the success or failure of PbD. The two initiatives that are examined are 
the introduction of facial recognition technology into existing cameras in 
casinos in Ontario, an initiative that is generally lauded for the success 
of PbD, and the expanded deployment of cameras within the public 
transit system of Toronto, in which PbD did not take hold. Since, in 
both instances, the potentially intrusive technology and its potential 
PbD solution were similar, the case study is able to focus on the role of 
1. EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] 
OJ, L 119/1, art 25(1) [GDPR].
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the regulator and the regulator’s impact with greater certainty.
The paper is divided into the following sections. After this first 
introductory section, it discusses and introduces PbD, its principles, 
and its evolution, leading in the second section to its incorporation into 
regulatory frameworks. The second section also reviews engineering 
challenges to the application of PbD and other relevant criticisms of 
PbD. The third section provides the methodology and the details of the 
case study and how the interviews conducted during the case study were 
analyzed to arrive at the findings of this paper. The fourth section then 
sets out the findings. Finally, the fifth section draws conclusions from the 
findings in three main areas: the persistence of privacy as an engineering 
problem, the growing recognition of privacy as an issue of organizational 
change and leadership, and consequently, the evolution of the role of the 
regulator with some thoughts as to how PbD can best flourish when it is 
part of a regulatory framework.
II. Privacy by Design
The origin of PbD can be found in early efforts to take the intent of the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) and translate these principles 
into the design and operation of information and communication 
technologies.2 The concept of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (“PETs”), 
as this effort was then known, showed how FIPPs could be reflected 
in information and communication technologies to achieve strong 
privacy protection. However, where PETs focused on technology and its 
potential to protect privacy, PbD prescribed that privacy be built directly 
and holistically into the design and operation, not only of technology, 
but also of operations, systems, work processes, management structures, 
physical spaces, and networked infrastructure. In this sense, PbD was the 
2. For an extended treatment of PbD origins, see Ann Cavoukian, “Privacy 
by Design: Origins, Meaning, and Prospects for Assuring Privacy and 
Trust in the Information Era” in George OM Yee, ed, Privacy Protection 
Measures and Technologies in Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards 
(Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2011) 170; Ann Cavoukian, “Privacy by 
Design: Leadership, Methods, and Results” in Serge Gutwirth et al, eds, 
European Data Protection: Coming of Age (New York: Springer, 2013) 175. 
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next step in the evolution of the privacy dialogue that first led to PETs.3
As formulated by Cavoukian, PbD consists of a set of seven 
“foundational principles”. These are:
1. Proactive, not Reactive; Preventative, not Remedial
2. Privacy as the Default
3. Privacy Embedded into Design
4. Full Functionality — Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum
5. End-to-End Lifecycle Protection
6. Visibility and Transparency
7. Respect for User Privacy4
At the time of its initial formulation (the early 1990s), PbD represented a 
significant shift from traditional approaches to protecting privacy, which 
focussed on regulation by setting minimum standards for information 
management practices and providing remedies through legal and 
regulatory instruments for privacy breaches. The traditional regulatory 
approach was described by Alexander Dix (former Berlin Commissioner 
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information) as “[l]ocking the stable 
door after the horse has bolted”.5 In contrast, PbD allowed for greater 
regulatory flexibility: 
In the past, FIPPs have largely been discharged through the adoption of policies 
and processes within the firm: privacy has been the bailiwick of lawyers. Now, 
under the rubric of “privacy by design,” policymakers are calling on the private 
sector to use the distinct attributes of code to harden privacy’s protection.6
3. See e.g. Gerrit Hornung, “Regulating Privacy Enhancing Technologies: 
Seizing the Opportunity of the Future European Data Protection 
Framework” (2013) 26:1–2 Innovation: The European Journal of Social 
Science Research 181 (some still appear to conflate PbD with PETs).
4. Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, “Privacy by 
Design: The 7 Foundational Principles”, by Ann Cavoukian (Toronto: 
IPC, August 2009). 
5. Alexander Dix, “Built-in Privacy—No Panacea, But a Necessary 
Condition for Effective Privacy Protection” (2010) 3:2 Identity in the 
Information Society 257 at 257.
6. Deirdre K Mulligan & Jennifer King, “Bridging the Gap Between 
Privacy and Design” (2012) 14:4 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Constitutional Law 989 at 992 [Mulligan & King, “Bridging the Gap”]. 
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Since its original formulation by Cavoukian, PbD has steadily gained 
recognition and acceptance over the last two decades, and while it seemed 
radical at first, it has come into widespread usage as part of the vocabulary 
of privacy regulators, advocates, and information technology professionals 
as well as the subject of flattering media articles.7 A major milestone 
in this journey was the Jerusalem 2010 resolution of the International 
Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners.8 The resolution recognized 
PbD as an “essential component of fundamental privacy protection”.9 
The resolution further “[encourages] the adoption of Privacy by Design’s 
Foundational Principles” as part of “an organization’s default mode of 
operation”10 and “[invites] Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners/
Authorities to: promote Privacy by Design …; foster the incorporation 
of [its] Foundational Principles in the formulation of privacy policy 
and legislation within their respective jurisdictions …; [and] encourage 
research on Privacy by Design”.11
Indeed, research into PbD has flourished following the resolution. 
From specific projects attempting to demonstrate the success of particular 
7. Kashmir Hill, “Why ‘Privacy By Design’ Is The New Corporate Hotness” 
Forbes (28 July 2011), online: Forbes <https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2011/07/28/why-privacy-by-design-is-the-new-corporate-
hotness/>.
8. 32nd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, “Resolution on Privacy by Design” International 
Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (29 
October 2010), online: ICDPPC <www.icdppc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/32-Conference-Israel-resolution-on-Privacy-by-Design.
pdf>. 
9. Ibid at 2. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
7(2018) 4 CJCCL
approaches, such as facial recognition,12 ubiquitous computing,13 
internet protocols,14 and other “privacy-invasive technologies”15 to more 
general attempts to apply PbD to information and communication 
technologies,16 to projects that argue that PbD implementation should 
be based on an understanding of contemporary privacy practices,17 the 
cumulative effect of academic research into PbD has been largely to assist 
in the ongoing transformation of PbD from a theoretical concept into a 
regulatory instrument.18 In 2014, Australia’s Commissioner referred to 
PbD explicitly in its guidelines to Australia’s new privacy legislation,19 
and Victoria became the first Australian state privacy office to explicitly 
12. Juanita Pedraza et al, “Privacy-by-design rules in face recognition system” 
(2013) 109:1 Neurocomputing 49.
13. Marc Langheinrich, “Privacy by Design — Principles of Privacy-Aware 
Ubiquitous Systems” in Gregory D Abowd, Barry Brumitt & Steven 
Shafer, eds, Ubicomp 2001: Ubiquitous Computing: International 
Conference Atlanta, Georgia, USA, September 30–October 2, 2001 
Proceedings (New York: Springer, 2001) 273.
14. Adamantia Rachovitsa, “Engineering and Lawyering Privacy by Design: 
Understanding Online Privacy Both as a Technical and an International 
Human Rights Issue” (2016) 24:4 International Journal of Law and 
Information 374.
15. Demetrius Klitou, Privacy-Invading Technologies and Privacy by Design: 
Safeguarding Privacy, Liberty and Security in the 21st Century (The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press, 2014).
16. Marc van Lieshout et al, “Privacy by Design: An Alternative to 
Existing Practice in Safeguarding Privacy” (2011) 13:6 Info 55; Dag 
Wiese Schartum, “Making Privacy by Design Operative” (2016) 24:2 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 151.
17. Kenneth A Bamberger & Deirdre K Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground: 
Driving Corporate Behavior in the United States and Europe (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2015). 
18. Mulligan & King, “Bridging the Gap”, supra note 6; Ira S Rubinstein, 
“Regulating Privacy by Design” (2011) 26:3 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal 1409. 
19. Tarryn Ryan & Veronica Scott, “AUSTRAILIA — Australia Legislates 
for Privacy by Design” International Association of Privacy Professionals (11 
February 2014), online: IAPP <https://iapp.org/news/a/australia-australia-
legislates-for-privacy-by-design/>.
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endorse and implement PbD.20 In the United States, the proposed 
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 referenced PbD explicitly 
and would have required it as a business practice.21 The Congressional 
Privacy Bill directly followed the release of the White House’s proposal 
for a privacy bill, which also mentioned PbD, suggesting that the US 
government had a clear policy of incorporating PbD principles into its 
legislative initiatives.22
In Europe, the European Commission ratified the final version of the 
GDPR in 2016.23 The Regulation will be enforced beginning in 2018, 
providing organizations with two years to become compliant. Article 25 
of the GDPR codifies both the concepts of PbD and privacy by default.24 
Under this Article, an organization (“data controller”) is required to 
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures both at 
the time of determination of the means for processing and at the time of 
the processing itself in order to ensure that data protection principles are 
met. In addition, the organization will need to ensure that, by default, 
only personal information which is necessary for each specific purpose of 
the data processing is, in fact, processed. Personal information will not 
be automatically made available to third parties. Social media companies, 
for example, will no longer be able to offer default settings for their apps 
in which information is shared or available to the public. 
20. Hamish Barwik, “Victoria to adopt Privacy by Design: Victorian 
Commissioner” Computerworld (6 May 2014), online: Computerworld 
<www.computerworld.com.au/article/544416/victoria_adopt_privacy_
by_design_victorian_commissioner>; Commissioner for Privacy and Data 
Protection, “Privacy by Design: How to manage privacy effectively in 
the Victorian public sector” (20 November 2014), online: CPDP <www.
cpdp.vic.gov.au/images/content/pdf/CPDP_Media_Release_Privacy_by_
Design_20_November_2014.pdf >.
21. HR 1053, 114th Cong, s 113.
22. Libbie Canter, “White House Privacy Bill: A Deeper Dive” Inside Privacy 
(27 February 2015), online: Inside Privacy <https://www.insideprivacy.
com/advertising-marketing/white-house-privacy-bill-a-deeper-dive/>.
23. GDPR, supra note 1.
24. EC, Data Protection Day 2015: Concluding the EU Data Protection Reform 
essential for the Digital Single Market (Brussels: 28 January 2015). 
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The explicit incorporation of PbD for the first time into a major 
legislative initiative has placed both the concept and the manner in 
which it has been incorporated into the GDPR under intense scrutiny. 
Some have hailed the GDPR for taking a “flexible approach” to PbD.25 
Organizations implementing PbD, for example, will be able to take into 
account costs as well as conduct a risk assessment in order to determine 
the appropriate level of privacy protection and design. Others, however, 
have criticized the European approach for being too focussed on the 
notion of privacy as control over personal information, which is a notion 
favoured by information and privacy commissioners.26 Mainly, however, 
questions remain as to how PbD will actually be applied as part of the 
GDPR. How will this norm be understood and enforced? Some attempt 
to bridge the gap between law and engineering,27 while others believe it 
is difficult, if not impossible to bridge this gap, and accordingly see the 
application of PbD to other dimensions of organizational behaviour.28
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the 
success of and future application of PbD through the examination of 
two initiatives in Ontario using the case study method. The case study 
method has been used by others with respect to PbD, but somewhat 
25. Frederick Leentfaar, “Privacy by design and default” Taylor Wessing 
(November 2016), online: Taylor Wessing <https://www.taylorwessing.
com/globaldatahub/article-privacy-by-design-and-default.html>.
26. Deirdre K Mulligan & Kenneth A Bamberger, “What Regulators Can Do 
to Advance Privacy Through Design” (2013) 56:11 Communications of 
the ACM 20.
27. Michael Colesky, Jaap-Henk Hoepman & Christiaan Hillen, “A Critical 
Analysis of Privacy Design Strategies” (Paper delivered at the 2016 IEEE 
Security and Privacy Workshops in San Jose California, 26 May 2016), 
Security and Privacy Workshops, 2016 IEEE 33. 
28. Bert-Jaap Koops & Ronald Leenes, “Privacy Regulation Cannot be 
Hardcoded: A Critical Comment on the Privacy by Design Provision 
in Data-Protection Law” (2014) 28:2 International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology 159; see also Michael Birnhack, Eran Toch 
& Irit Hadar, “Privacy Mindset, Technological Mindset” (2014) 55:1 
Jurimetrics 55.
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tangentially.29 In contrast, this paper centres on two initiatives in which 
potentially intrusive technology was introduced with explicit references to 
PbD and the findings that can be drawn from them in order to determine 
the role of regulatory intervention and contribute to the conversation 
as to how PbD may be applied when it is set as a legal standard. The 
following section discusses the details of the initiatives and the case-study 
methodology used in their exploration.
III. The Case Study
A. The Legal and Regulatory Background
The Province of Ontario (Canada) has specific privacy legislation for 
organizations operating in the public sector. The Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act30 (“FIPPA”) and the Municipal Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act31 (“MFIPPA”) govern the public 
sector at the provincial and municipal levels, respectively. However, 
Ontario has no specific privacy legislation for organizations operating 
in the private sector. Instead, the federal Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act32 (“PIPEDA”) applies to the private sector. 
Ontario also has specific privacy legislation for health service providers, 
the Personal Health Information Protection Act33 (“PHIPA”). Private sector 
operators in the health sector are governed by PHIPA as well, which is 
considered substantially similar to PIPEDA.
The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (“IPC”) is the 
regulator that enforces FIPPA, MFIPPA, and PHIPA. The Commissioner 
29. Inga Kroener & David Wright, “A Strategy for Operationalizing Privacy 
by Design” (2014) 30:5 Information Society 355.
30. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31 
[FIPPA].
31. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 
1990, c M.56 [MFIPPA].
32. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 
[PIPEDA].  
33. Personal Health Information Protection Act, SO 2004, c 3, Schedule A 
[PHIPA].
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is appointed by and reports to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario and is 
independent of the executive branch. Under the three acts and statutory 
mandate, the Commissioner is responsible for:
• Resolving access to information appeals and complaints when 
government or health care practitioners and organizations refuse 
to grant requests for access or correction;
• Investigating privacy complaints with respect to personal 
information held by government or health care practitioners and 
organizations;
• Ensuring that the government organizations and health 
information custodians comply with the provisions of the Acts;
• Educating the public about Ontario’s access and privacy laws; 
and
• Conducting research on access and privacy issues and providing 
advice and comment on proposed government legislation and 
programs.34
During Cavoukian’s fifteen-year tenure as Commissioner, her office 
carried out its mandate under what became known as the “3C” approach 
— Consultation, Co-operation, and Collaboration. Co-operation was 
emphasized over confrontation to resolve complaints. Collaboration 
was sought proactively by seeking partnerships to find joint solutions 
to emerging privacy and access issues.35 Internally, her 3C approach led 
Cavoukian to create a research, policy, and special projects department 
that was separate and distinct from the Office’s compliance, enforcement, 
investigations, and complaints responsibilities. This department had a 
34. Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Role and Mandate”, 
online: IPC <www.ipc.on.ca/about-us/role-and-mandate/>.
35. This approach led, for example, to positive results in the area of privacy 
breaches. Public institutions covered under FIPPA and MFIPPA 
voluntarily self-reported data breaches to the IPC despite the Acts having 
no breach notification requirements. Hundreds of data breaches were 
reported voluntarily in this way, allowing the office to play a vital role at 
critical breach management stages.
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diverse set of skills and competency with a focus on policy, legal, and 
technology expertise and played a significant role with respect to the two 
initiatives discussed here.
B. The Two Initiatives
The focus of this paper is on two organizations that are covered by 
Ontario’s privacy legislation and for which the IPC has oversight 
responsibilities. Brief background information on each of the institutions 
is provided below.
1. The Toronto Transit Commission (“TTC”)
The TTC is an agency of the City of Toronto and is overseen by a Board.36 
The TTC is responsible for public transit within the municipal area of 
Toronto by means of busses, streetcars, and subway trains. The TTC is 
regulated by the IPC under MFIPPA, but unlike the Ontario Lottery 
and Gaming Corporation (“OLG”) (discussed below), there is no 
formal regulator that provides oversight for the core activity of the TTC 
(transportation). The TTC is governed by general legislation applicable 
to other public sector agencies and by the City of Toronto by-laws. 
2. The Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation 
(“OLG”)
The OLG is an “Operational Enterprise Agency” of Ontario. Its purpose 
is to provide gaming and lottery entertainment (casinos, lotteries, horse-
racing etc.) while maximizing benefits in a “socially responsible manner”.37 
As an operational enterprise agency, the OLG has a single shareholder, the 
Government of Ontario, and it reports through its Board of Directors to 
Ontario’s Minister of Finance. Board appointments are not full-time, and 
36. Toronto Transit Commission, “The Board” Toronto Transit Commission, 
online: TTC <www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_
information/index.jsp>.
37. Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, “ABOUT OLG” Ontario 
Lottery and Gaming Corporation, online: OLG <about.olg.ca/who-we-
are/>.
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Directors do not manage the OLG directly.38 The OLG is an institution 
governed by FIPPA, but its main regulator, for the purposes of gaming, 
is the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario39 (“AGCO”). The 
AGCO operates under the Alcohol and Gaming Regulation and Public 
Protection Act, 1996.40 Unlike the IPC, the AGCO is not independent of 
the government and reports to the Ministry of the Attorney General.41
3. The TTC Initiative
The TTC initiative began with a complaint to the IPC in the fall of 2007. 
Privacy International, an organization based in England, complained 
about the TTC’s plan to expand its CCTV surveillance systems by 
adding more video surveillance cameras in the subway system. It is 
noteworthy to mention that the TTC already had in place a robust 
CCTV surveillance program (with policies and procedures) and an 
extensive systems network that included older analog and newer digital 
CCTV technology.42 According to the letter, the TTC was in violation of 
MFIPPA.43 The IPC launched an investigation into the TTC’s practices 
in response to the letter of complaint. The investigation did not proceed 
in a traditional manner given the heightened public interest in video 
surveillance systems at the time and the impact of these systems on 
privacy. Cavoukian decided that alongside the formal investigation of the 
complaint, her office would expand the investigation to examine “the role 
that privacy-enhancing technologies can play in mitigating the privacy-
38. Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, “Our Reporting Structure” 
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, online: OLG <about.olg.ca/
corporate-governance/>.
39. Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario, online: AGCO <www.
agco.on.ca/en/whatwedo/index_commercial.aspx> [AGCO]. 
40. Alcohol and Gaming Regulation and Public Protection Act, SO 1996, c 26, 
Schedule.
41. AGCO, supra note 39.
42. Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Privacy and Video 
Surveillance in Mass Transit Systems: A Special Investigation Report”, by 
Ann Cavoukian, Privacy Investigation Report MC07-68 (Toronto: IPC, 3 
March 2008) at 16 [IPCO, “Privacy and Video Surveillance”].
43. Ibid. 
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invasive nature of video surveillance cameras”.44 In the introduction to 
the section of the report discussing PETs, Cavoukian further stated: “it 
is essential that privacy protections be built directly into [the] design 
and implementation [of technology], right from the outset. This view is 
captured in my mantra of ‘privacy by design’”.45 The report then discussed 
a specific form of image and object detection and encryption developed 
by research engineers at the University of Toronto (“U of T”).46
The investigative report found that the TTC was in compliance with 
MFIPPA.47 Still, the report outlined twelve recommendations for the 
TTC of which two related to the software solution and PbD:
11. That the TTC should keep abreast of research on emerging privacy-
enhancing technologies and adopt these technologies, whenever possible. 
12. That the TTC should select a location to evaluate the privacy-enhancing 
video surveillance technology developed by the University of Toronto 
researchers.48
The final recommendation required the TTC to provide “proof of 
compliance or an update on the status of its compliance with each of 
the recommendations” within three months of the date of the Report.49 
Unlike other investigation reports often handled exclusively by the 
Office’s compliance, enforcement, investigations, and complaints unit, 
the research, policy, and special projects department was brought in to 
collaborate with the TTC on this technology recommendation. 
The exploration by the TTC of privacy-enhancing video surveillance 
was a direct result of the recommendation to do so by the regulator in 
the investigation report. The TTC responded by providing the U of 
44. Ibid at 1.
45. Ibid at 12.
46. Karl Martin & Konstantinos N Plataniotis, “Secure Visual Object Based 
Coding for Privacy Protected Surveillance” (2007), Draft Submitted 
to IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, 
online: IEEE <www.comm.toronto.edu/~kostas/Publications2008/pub/
submitted/2007-submitted-Martin-ieee_csvt_secure_stspiht.pdf>.
47. IPCO, “Privacy and Video Surveillance”, supra note 42 at 43. 
48. Ibid at 44.
49. Ibid.
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T researchers access to a test environment and its subway monitoring 
room to allow the researchers to evaluate the feasibility of the technology 
in a subway platform context over a few months. After the researchers 
completed the testing and evaluation of the technology, the TTC 
determined that it would not be possible to incorporate the software 
technology into its CCTV systems. 
4. The OLG Initiative
Unlike the TTC initiative, the OLG Privacy by Design project did not 
arise out of an official complaint and investigation report. Instead, also 
in 2007, the OLG approached the IPC to discuss whether it would be 
legally permissible for the OLG to adopt facial recognition technology 
for its voluntary “self-exclusion” program. The “self-exclusion” program 
allows persons that are addicted to gambling to ask the OLG to remove 
them from gambling premises that they wish to enter. The approach used 
until then by the OLG was paper-based, requiring security officers to 
review photos and related identification information on the program 
registrants and then manually attempt to recognize registrants and 
pick them out of the casino crowds.50 The OLG sought to modernize 
its monitoring of individuals entering gambling facilities after several 
incidents in which individuals were not recognized and, therefore, not 
removed from gambling facilities even though they were enrolled in the 
“self-exclusion” program.
The result of the preliminary discussion was a research and pilot 
project into the development and application of biometric encryption to 
the OLG’s facial recognition system. The project required collaboration 
between the OLG, the IPC, the U of T, and iView (a video surveillance 
vendor). The IPC’s research policy and special projects department led 
this initiative, with no involvement from the enforcement, compliance, 
investigations, and complaints sections of the IPC. 
50. For more information on the operation of OLG’s self-excluded program 
see: Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, “Privacy-
Protective Facial Recognition: Biometric Encryption Proof of Concept”, 
by Ann Cavoukian & Tom Marinelli (Toronto: IPC, November 2010) 
[IPCO, “Privacy-Protective Facial Recognition”]. 
16 
 
Levin,  Privacy by Design by Regulation
At the end of the project, the OLG successfully implemented the 
technology in twenty-seven of its locations.51 The IPC and the OLG 
also published a report in which they reported on the success of the 
project and the successful integration of the technology developed at the 
U of T with the OLG’s facial recognition system: “This use of BE as a 
secondary classifier was shown to enhance patron privacy (both for those 
on the watch list, and regular patrons), system security, and even overall 
accuracy of the watch list system within the context of the OLG self-
exclusion program”.52 
C. Research Methodology
This research project used a case study approach to examine the 
introduction of PbD into the OLG and the TTC’s response to embedding 
privacy into video surveillance technology and the role that the regulator 
had in these organizations taking a PbD approach. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with at least three individuals involved in each 
initiative who had an active and leadership role from both a strategic 
policy and technical perspective. The questionnaire is included as an 
appendix to this paper. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and 
then read by members of the research team to identify key threads in the 
conversations and arrive at the findings listed in the following section. 
It should be noted that individuals were asked to recollect details on an 
initiative in which they were involved ten years ago and that, as is with 
any case study, the ability to generalize from it is limited.
Participants are not identified and referred to in the project, and 
quotations from their interview, according to the table below, include 
brief, non-identifying information about each participant:
Participant Role
P1 Strategic decision-maker
51. Sharon Oosthoek, “OLG facial scans to help gambling addicts” CBC 
News (26 November 2010), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/technology/
olg-facial-scans-to-help-gambling-addicts-1.929760>.
52. IPCO, “Privacy-Protective Facial Recognition”, supra note 50 at 14.
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P2 Senior project management/
technical
P3 Legal/regulatory
P4 Project implementation/senior 
technical 
P5 Project implementation
P6 Legal/regulatory
P7 Research/technical
IV. Findings
It is worth repeating the cautionary methodological note about 
generalizing from this case study of PbD in Ontario, Canada to the 
success or failure of PbD in other jurisdictions. With that caveat in 
mind, this section presents the main points about the implementation 
of PbD and the role of the regulator that emerges from the interviews. 
The findings are organized into three overarching themes. The first 
theme focuses on PbD — reaction to the concept, working with the 
principles, engineering challenges, etc. The second theme centers on the 
organizational and leadership dimensions of the two initiatives. Finally, 
the third group consists of those findings that focused on the regulator 
— the ideal regulatory role, the place of legislation, the support given by 
Cavoukian’s office, etc.
A. The PbD Theme
1. PbD and Legacy Systems
The constraint of existing technological and infrastructure systems 
— “Legacy Systems” is both a conceptual and practical barrier to the 
implementation of PbD: 
Privacy by design presupposes … a process whereby a new information 
system is designed or an existing system is redesigned or adjusted. Building 
systems from scratch opens for more possibilities than does changing 
existing systems. Comprehensive changes in existing systems will often meet 
some clear limitations: Basic properties of information systems greatly limit 
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improvements.53
Such a constraint existed both at the OLG and at the TTC. Yet the search 
for a privacy-protective solution created an opportunity since there were 
no “off-the-shelf ” solutions for the facial recognition problems that both 
organizations faced. P2 stated:
When we talked about using facial recognition, a lot of people said, well that’s 
been tried before, you’re going to waste your time. And I would give [to P1] 
who was the person that said we’re going to do this, at the start. Which kind of 
put the gauntlet out to the technology people – now we’ve got to step up and 
see if we can do this.
And P5 added: 
“it was always we were going to be doing biometric encryption with facial 
recognition to protect privacy”. That is of course, in a sense, a precondition 
for the idea of PbD to begin with. Choosing to design privacy into a solution 
may have been easier, therefore, because a solution had to be developed “from 
scratch”. 
While at the OLG, the search was on for a specific privacy-protective 
solution to the problem of self-excluded patrons seeking re-entry. At the 
TTC it appears that the scope was wider. The TTC already had a network 
of CCTV cameras that were used in the subway, some of which belonged 
to a legacy system (e.g. analog cameras). As noted by P7:
This system was the existing one including existing cameras and storage/
monitoring infrastructure for buses, streetcars and subway station platforms. 
In other words, this project was looking at [the] existing legacy system – it 
was not about designing a new system. It was retrofitting. Two options were 
available: i) put in a new system; or ii) retrofit the existing system to comply 
with PbD. 
The TTC also had to deal with separate policy concerns, ranging from 
passenger safety and operator safety to national security concerns post 
9/11.54 It seems that it was easier to design and apply an innovative 
solution to a limited problem than it was to retrofit an existing legacy 
system meant to address a wide range of policy concerns.
53. Schartum, supra note 16 at 161; see also Nigel Davies & Marc 
Langheinrich, “Privacy by Design” (2013) 12:2 IEEE Pervasive 
Computing 2 [Davies & Langheinrich, “Privacy by Design”]. 
54. P6, transcript on file. 
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2. Initial Reaction to PbD
It appears that the OLG staff were not specifically aware of PbD as an 
idea or of its principles. Staff at different levels reacted to PbD differently. 
P1 saw the public policy appeal: 
It always starts with an idea of design, if you build in that planning and 
thoughtfulness at the front end of work, that privacy and protection of 
information is not something that happens at the end of the story, it happens 
all the way through and why is that different, than anything else we would 
design?  
But for P2, PbD initially held little value: 
To be honest when I first read the principle I thought so how [is] this going 
to help us … because it’s so conceptual … how are we going to take these 
principles and actually get down to doing facial recognition to aid in self-
exclusion. I would tell you that the technical guys were not convinced that we 
could do this. 
P5 was also lukewarm: 
I thought, well it doesn’t really make a lot of sense actually. That’s really what 
I thought. Well my initial thoughts were, I don’t see, I don’t understand this. 
Because I’m looking at it purely from a solution point of view. It really was 
difficult for me at the beginning to understand, why we were putting biometric 
encryption in. The reason I had a big issue with it, was because what we were 
calling the biometric, the image, was already public. So it was already out there, 
and it actually had to be out there in order for the security officers to be able to 
identify people. So we could not actually hold that secret. We couldn’t do it. So 
it had to be, it actually had to be open, and I’m saying, well if it’s already open, 
then what is biometric encryption doing here.
At the TTC, there were similar concerns about the conflation of PbD 
with biometric encryption and whether there was any advantage to the 
U of T research project over existing commercial solutions. Explains P6: 
I don’t think that there were any issues with the privacy by design, there were 
suggestions or recommendations that you go look at technology that U of T 
was studying. So you were kind of led down a specific kind of path from a 
privacy by design perspective, and I will tell you the engineers didn’t necessarily 
think what [U of T] had was so different than what already existed in the 
market.
Against such mixed reaction, it seems that the regulator’s role was crucial 
in both convincing and supporting the OLG in its attempt to design 
privacy rather than focus on “merely” being in compliance. 
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3. Working with PbD principles
For the OLG initiative, the search for a solution that would allow for 
biometric facial recognition and protect the privacy of customers captured 
in the system evolved and transformed over time. P4 said that initially: 
“[the Commissioner’s] thinking was kind of an interesting concept, in 
terms of being able to protect biometric in the database, and that was 
the problem we were trying to solve”. However, it seems that the early 
attempts were not successful. P5 commented on the lack of familiarity 
with PbD and its principles: 
I didn’t have a lot of privacy by design experience … So maybe a few months 
in, or six months in we started to look at the privacy by design principles, 
and what I did was an alignment exercise to say, how do we align? You know 
the stuff that we’re planning on doing and going to be doing. How does that 
align to the seven principles? My question in terms of trying to go through the 
design process and the solution process is, are those principles there to sort of 
have you wrestle with them as you try and come up with these solutions and 
have the conversation with the commissioner, or is that something that you’re 
sort of already advanced in terms of the solution and then you sort of tried to 
fit what you were doing to these ideas of privacy by design?
Following the alignment exercise, P5 described the process of searching 
for a privacy solution and how the “problem” was re-defined: “I had an 
idea of how we could use biometric encryption that I could live with … 
So I had a conversation in one of our meetings … and the first thing 
[the Commissioner] said was that’s an absolutely good use of biometric 
encryption”. After the approval of the Commissioner for the new manner 
in which privacy was to be designed into the facial recognition system, P5 
concluded: “A lot of weight came off me, because now I could believe in 
it, and I could actually build something that makes sense”. 
P4 also shared concerns over the technology of biometric encryption 
and whether it was compatible with PbD principles, specifically the “full 
functionality” principle: “That’s what the research was all about, if it 
wasn’t going to work, one of the things we would stop, the whole concept 
of biometric encryption because it wasn’t going to be feasible”. And more 
generally P4 added: 
Do I believe that we were on the right page on protecting people’s privacy 
from day one? I think we were, but because we look at the holistic solution 
around privacy, I think the risk, when you look at the necessity for biometric 
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encryption, it’s not clear that we had to do that. So I think as a case study, 
there were some good benefits out of it, but at the end of the day, privacy by 
design and the principles of privacy by design, are good software engineering 
design principles regardless. How practical each one of them are, are totally 
dependable on each individual project.
In addition, the OLG was concerned with fundamental privacy principles 
such as Purpose Specification and whether their proposal to digitize and 
store facial images would comply with it. P3 pointed out that:
What we have to guard against, is having their image … on file so that it could 
potentially be used for a secondary purpose, if there’s a crime in the area and 
the police come to you, with a warrant, with a lawful court order, and they say 
we want to access all your biometric that you have on file … that would be a 
secondary use that even though it is lawful … we wouldn’t want that.
P4 also noted that there were other, more protective alternatives that were 
less attractive from a commercial point of view: “OK Ontario, basically 
say everybody, anyone who wants to buy a gaming product, needs to have 
a card, needs to be registered. Ontario doesn’t want to go there, right …”
At the TTC, the project never progressed beyond the research phase, 
seemingly not because of difficulties related to working with PbD and its 
principles but because of technological obstacles. According to P7: 
The solution could be implemented but remember this was done several years 
back unlike the advances that have developed recently in the area of CCTV 
systems … If the TTC invested early on and made a commitment to this 
privacy enhancing technology, this encoding could be done on the camera 
which is more secure and easy to implement.
4. PbD and Education
Participants were asked to generalize about PbD on the basis of their 
experience and their specific project. P2 believes that education of 
engineers in PbD is absolutely essential if it is to succeed beyond a few 
examples: 
I think [PbD] principles are just what they are, principles. So they guide you. 
I think the body of knowledge has to follow after that. So I often thought 
about the universities, and within some of these information programs that 
you actually start introducing the concepts of the seven principles into the 
university so that the students that are coming out are very aware.
P7 added that part of the difficulty is that engineering education is 
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regulated and largely prescribed by the profession: 
To do [PbD] requires, needs, direction to engineers to do it. Nothing prevents 
this in technical solutions. It is difficult with undergraduate [education]. 
Engineers are regulated. It takes a bit more time for engineers to react. 10-20 
years ago privacy was not so important … I don’t see problems with integrating 
PbD into curricula or into products.
As to the PbD principles and whether they are detailed enough to provide 
guidance for engineers, P7 is of the opinion that “what is missing is the 
educated people who can take the inspirational message [of PbD] and 
make sense of it”. For P7, that is similar to any other engineering design 
exercise: “customer gives specs the way the customer understands. The 
designer/builder needs to translate the customer specs. [We] need people 
to take [the privacy] message and translate it”.
5. Legislating PbD
Based on the TTC project, P6 is concerned about any attempt to legislate 
or impose PbD: “when the organization wants something, and you do it 
in consultation, then the privacy by design concept gets a much bigger 
play, and succeeds. When imposed, it has far less opportunity to be 
successful”.
P3 is pleased with the legislation of PbD but concerned about the 
bureaucratization of PbD: 
First of all here’s why I think it’s a very positive thing to have it in the legislation. 
By having it in, the GDPR in the statute, it automatically elevates, because 
companies will now be required to embed privacy as the default, to have 
privacy by design, data prediction by design, it’s no longer just a suggestion, 
it’s required, and that by necessity will raise the bar. You can kind of see it as 
default. We’re talking positive consent that is not the prevailing standard as 
you know. So that’s what raises the bar. My only concern, I don’t even want 
to express this as a concern but a question. I don’t want this to get regulated 
to death.
That may be because other regulators have been slow to embrace PbD, 
although now it enjoys regulatory consensus. According to P3: 
the whole privacy by design thing, it took three years of presentations at the EU 
commissioners meeting, before it took off. The first couple of years it received 
polite applause perhaps. The third year, the UK commissioner she came from 
the telco world, and then she became commissioner, and she got it like this, 
and then the EU has commissioner’s meetings, the EU commissioners, she 
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started propagating it and it just flew after 2004-5.
Therefore, it is notable that PbD has enjoyed the greatest success with 
regulators that have a non-legal background.
6. Theme Summary
The main findings emerging from the PbD theme, therefore, relate to 
the gap between the principles of PbD and the concept of PbD on the 
one hand and the attempts of implementing PbD as an engineering 
solution on the other. The constraints of having to work with legacy 
systems, the lack of familiarity with PbD, and its principles necessitating 
both a learning curve as well as time-consuming mapping exercises in 
which PbD is mapped against software and hardware design processes 
with which engineers are more familiar led to a difficult implementation 
process. In one initiative, this process stalled, while in the other it had to 
be restructured and rethought in order to arrive ultimately at a successful 
solution. One suggestion that would assist in bridging this gap was 
the educational one — the inclusion of PbD and its principles in the 
contemporary engineering curriculum. Notably, the move to enshrine 
PbD in legislation was met with concerns.
B. The Organizational Theme
1. Internal Support
Overall, internal support for the project at the OLG was achieved by 
ensuring that all internal stakeholders were updated. Beyond the support 
of leadership from a public policy perspective, the design of privacy into 
the facial recognition system required the support of the technical staff 
that worked on the project. P2 described the process: 
Our approach was pretty structured … so there was never all of a sudden 
somebody coming in and [raising concerns]. So at any point in time, when we 
went through that structure, we educated our stakeholders. We brought them 
in the room, sat down, and talked to them about what we found, the good the 
bad and the ugly, because there were a few times that we actually thought that 
it wasn’t going to work.
At that key moment, when the OLG could have decided to stop pursuing 
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the design of privacy, the support of the regulator and of the technical 
staff was crucial. Continues P2: 
we actually had a meeting down at [the Commissioner’s] office and she was 
quite clear that she wanted us to move forward with this, so back at the ranch 
we sat down and we brainstormed. How is this going to work? And I would 
say a key individual that we actually brought on at that time … who actually 
took it upon himself to say, look I’m going to try to solve this … I wasn’t quite 
confident that we can actually pull off the design, until this gentleman came 
in, and he took it upon himself as a challenge.
The success of the solution beyond PbD assisted with the support for 
privacy in general in the organization in subsequent years. P5 explains: 
we actually came up with examples of how we were actually adhering to the 
PbD principles and in some cases not, right. So we looked at the one about 
positive sum and what that means, as an example, and then we looked at what 
we were doing. Here’s a perfect time to tell you about the unexpected benefit 
of biometric encryption. We had the two classifiers, face recognition whittling 
down the problem, and then biometric encryption taking over. Just the fact 
that you’re doing two different classifiers, it actually made your accuracy of the 
system better. What that did is it actually led people to believe in the system 
more, where they say, yeah we’re going to get some false alarms, but we’ve 
brought it down from 4% false alarms – which is a lot, down to under 2%. 
Which is pretty damn good. Like in the biometric field, that’s really really good 
results.
At the TTC, internal support never built up for the biometric encryption 
PbD initiative and perhaps, consequently, it did not progress beyond the 
research stage. Apart from the concerns over working specifically with the 
research team at the U of T (mentioned above), it seems the specific PbD 
route proposed by the Commissioner was incompatible with existing 
TTC technology at the time. P6 elaborated: 
If you were doing live monitoring, [the proposed solution] would help to 
address privacy issues about how much information people were seeing. Where 
there was a disconnect, [the TTC] did very little monitoring … and the places 
where it would be monitored, our systems are so old that even [there] they said 
you couldn’t do it.
According to P7, the TTC did not provide funding on a comparable level 
to that of the OLG: 
The project lasted only a few months which included meetings. No funding 
from TTC.  [The Commissioner] provided ‘in kind’ resources – staff for project 
management.  TTC provided ‘in kind’ resources – access to equipment in Bay 
station. OLG was different because there was funding. OLG, by its nature, has 
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significant technical resources. Organizationally, there was a lack of interest as 
well at the TTC in comparison with OLG. At OLG, there was interest from 
CEO through to technical staff. TTC had different priorities – I doubt that 
even with senior management approval [they would have] the expertise. [The 
TTC had] other major issues, had older generation of trains. It felt that TTC 
was more exploratory, unlike OLG.
Further, as quoted above, P7 adds that the project at the TTC may not 
have been, strictly speaking, a PbD project: “In other words, this project 
was looking at existing legacy system — it was not about designing a 
new system. It was retrofitting. Two options — put in a new system; or 
retrofit system to comply with PbD”.
Whether or not it was a “true” PbD exercise, the research project 
failed to elevate the importance of privacy within the TTC. P6 describes 
the attitude towards privacy: 
Other than regulators and some privacy advocacy groups, most of [the TTC] 
doesn’t [care especially] about privacy. So when you do the regulations, 
[privacy] becomes a checklist, and organizations who have generally [wanted] 
to implement a system which has a privacy impact to it, will pay a lip service 
to [privacy], and say yes, I designed it, I have a retention period that tries to 
address it … so I think that privacy becomes superficial.
2. The Role of the Internal Privacy Office
Interestingly, at the OLG, the internal access to information and privacy 
office had an insignificant role during the pilot project. P2 described it as 
“buried within the organization” and that its importance actually grew as 
a result of the success of the PbD project: 
I often sit back and say the whole privacy involvement started with this project. 
I mean people were aware, we had co-ordinators and stuff, but that was more 
[formal]. So now, right now at OLG if you think about it, in the project 
management life cycle, the privacy assessment, the central privacy assessment 
is right up front. It’s very grained in the method. 
P4 added: “this whole area of privacy by design and this policy was brand 
new at the time. Like privacy, when we started this program, privacy was, 
the whole privacy environment didn’t have anywhere near the visibility 
it had today”.
According to P5 as well, the importance of the privacy office grew 
after the success of the project: 
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So we probably always had a privacy department at OLG, but I think it 
probably expanded or had a little more visibility because, I truly believe that 
was a very important piece. And they were using that as an example of also 
helping people understand what do you do, do a PIA, do a privacy impact 
assessment. Do it up front. Understand what you’re doing, get it in at design 
time. Those terms, those little nuanced conversations about, even saying things 
like do it at design time. Those came from looking at [privacy] early.
3. Theme Summary
The findings related to the organizational theme, therefore, are that PbD 
initiatives, similar to any other initiative, need internal support in order 
to succeed. Internal support is required at all levels but, and significantly, 
even more so at the engineering level. Somewhat counterintuitively, the 
success or failure of the PbD initiative did not correlate with the existence 
of an active and visible privacy office within an organization, or even with 
the existence of a positive privacy culture. However, the success of a PbD 
initiative bolstered privacy after-the-fact throughout the organization.
C. The Regulator Theme
1. The Regulator’s Role in Early Stages
It seems that in this case study, it was difficult, if not impossible, for 
participants to separate the role of the office of the IPC from the person 
that held that position for over eighteen years in Ontario. The paper 
discusses this duality further in the following section, but it was evident 
to participants that they had to deal not only with formal legalistic 
regulatory requirements but also with the personal convictions of the 
Commissioner. P1 put it in the following terms: 
I would say that Ann was really trying to take organizations into the next 
century … what made her very unique, is she was always looking for ways in 
which you could actually operationalize [privacy]. She wasn’t just interested in 
reporting on it and investigating it, she wanted to know how to make it easier 
for people to do.  
As P3 observed, the OLG knew that: 
to contemplate doing this without checking in with the regulator would have 
been death in Ontario. Because [the Commissioner was] very vocal, and always 
said to government departments “Come and talk to me. I will help you behind 
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the scenes quietly”. 
P4 went further: “You know, the commissioner was not going to let us 
implement facial recognition without biometric encryption”.
For P6, it seemed as well that PbD was more of a personal interest of 
the Commissioner than of the formal investigation: 
Prior to [the investigation], I don’t ever recall the privacy by design aspect of that. 
So in the policy you’re being driven to privacy, but not in a broad perspective, 
and then when they come out with a report in 2008, you’re definitely getting 
the privacy by design aspects imposed in the recommendations and then in 
subsequent meetings with the privacy commissioner. You’re no doubt getting 
the privacy by design speech [from the commissioner].
Going forward, P6 added that PbD could simply be viewed as the price 
that has to be paid in order to avoid greater regulatory scrutiny and 
obtain regulatory approval: 
When you look at 2007, [the TTC was] already into the investigation and 
you have the requirements imposed on [the TTC]. And therefore [the TTC 
doesn’t] have a say, [it has to] meet the requirements. When [the TTC], prior 
to implementation, [goes] back to the regulators to sit with them, and work 
with them about what [the TTC does] with privacy by design, has much more 
attractiveness to me and why you get a far greater buy in. And the buy [in] isn’t 
because they necessarily believe in it, the buy in is the price for [the TTC] to 
be able to do what it wants, and so that is the fundamental difference. So when 
you look at where [the TTC is] today, about front facing [cameras] or even 
audio, it is the TTC who has a far greater objective now, will be much happier 
to do something, will spend the dollars in order to appease everyone, and will 
implement and take a far greater active approach to privacy by design.
2. Regulatory Support for the Initiatives 
In order to convince the OLG to consider PbD, the Commissioner 
not only raised concerns about the privacy implications of the new 
technology, but it appears that more importantly, the office offered 
support that exceeded traditional regulatory involvement. P3 described 
an initial meeting: 
We had this meeting in the boardroom, and [OLG CEO] laid this all out and 
she said I know [the Commissioner will] work with us to find a way to make 
this work. [And the Commissioner said] I have a solution but it has to be 
tested, a thing called biometric encryption.  
And for P2, the regulatory, unconventional support was crucial to 
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accepting to take on a PbD approach: 
We had the perfect storm. You had an agency of the crown, who was interested 
in social responsibility. You have a privacy commissioner who had the privacy 
by design aspect, and had competent people in her organization. You had 
[the University of Toronto], and we were fortunate enough to get an Ontario 
company that actually did the facial recognition. With all that together, [PbD] 
worked.
P4 spoke about the support provided by the Commissioner and meeting 
the needs of multiple stakeholders: 
We had regular status meetings … we got like OLG, privacy commissioner, 
U of T, the vendor, and then we had the AGCO, and then we had the site 
management and gaming management … At this point in time, when you’re 
running with multiple stakeholders, things get complicated. Too many people 
involved, [too] hard to do this work because you got too many stakeholders. In 
many cases, it can be really non-productive.
Despite the above lukewarm sentiments about the value of the regulator’s 
support, P4 added: 
My sense is, and again since the privacy commissioner changed, right now we 
have almost no relationship with [the privacy commissioner]. We, the science 
guys here, have no relationship with the privacy office downtown at all.
P4’s assessment fits the changes taken by the current IPC of Ontario, who 
has distanced himself and his office from the idea of PbD, for instance, 
by removing from the official website the numerous PbD resources that 
were created and promoted during the tenure of Cavoukian.
3. Primary vs Secondary Regulator
It appears that it was important for the success of PbD that the privacy 
regulator was “not” perceived as the primary regulator of the OLG (the 
TTC does not have a primary regulator). P4 provided an example: “as we 
started to move into the casino environment, to be able to do anything 
in the casino, you need the gaming regulator to be there … the regulator 
was there anytime you do anything in a casino”. 
And P5 stated more generally: 
There are big differences because the AGCO is the regulator of OLG. 
The privacy commissioner, yes, is a regulator as well, that’s a part of the 
commissioner’s office, but it’s different, because we are like, that’s a regulator of 
gambling, and we have massive amounts of gambling controls. It’s done purely 
for protection and for control.  The privacy commissioner is conceptual … 
29(2018) 4 CJCCL
Where at the AGCO, it’s very direct, ‘you will do this’.
4. Collaboration or Enforcement
Notably, following up on the previous theme, it seems that it was possible 
for the OLG to collaborate with the Privacy Commissioner as the 
secondary regulator and not be overly concerned about enforcement. In 
addition, Cavoukian’s 3C approach played an important role in creating 
collaboration not only between the OLG and the Privacy Commissioner 
but between the TTC and the Commissioner as well. Noted P3: 
“Cavoukian always favoured the carrot to the stick, … from a privacy 
perspective. She would rather address things up front, rather than after a 
breach has happened”. 
Indeed, it seems that at least at the OLG, it was realized early on 
at the conceptual stage of the project that privacy issues would need 
to be addressed during the development of facial recognition for video 
surveillance technology (P1, P2 interviews). It was clear at the senior level 
that the privacy regulator would likely raise concerns with combining 
surveillance and biometric technologies that would involve collecting 
sensitive information on all casino patrons, not just the target (self-
excluding) population (P1 interviews). Thus, there was an impetus to be 
proactive by reaching out to the Commissioner at the conceptual stage 
rather than after the design of the proposed system. At that point, it 
seemed that PbD would be an opportunity for collaboration with the 
regulator and that the PbD route would avoid the enforcement-style 
regulatory relationship. According to P4: 
OLG brought this forward to try and you know, talk to the privacy 
commissioner about using facial recognition … and I believe the privacy 
commissioner said no way … The privacy commissioner had published, or was 
getting ready to publish privacy by design … and was looking for use cases, or 
some experimental deployment to see if it would work. So [everyone] sort of 
put two and two together and said, OLG if you want to do this, we’ve got this 
privacy by design scenario, so would that work, would that be an opportunity.
At the TTC, the initial circumstances were different since there was 
already a complaint in front of the regulator about the use of CCTV 
within the TTC system. The complaint created a formal relationship 
of an investigation between the regulator and the TTC that did not 
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exist with the OLG. Prior to the complaint, it appears that an informal 
relationship did exist. States P6: 
The TTC had made public statements looking at cameras on the bus. 
So that adds a phone conversation and meetings with the Ontario Privacy 
Commissioner’s office saying we want to help you, we want to see the policy, 
we will work with you on the policy.
The complaint, in other words, forced the regulator and regulated into 
an enforcement-style relationship where collaboration would have been 
preferable and, indeed, had been attempted. The focus was on the formal 
investigation led by the compliance, enforcement, complaints, and 
investigations department. Only later did the more collaborative research, 
policy, and special projects department become involved when looking at 
the potential privacy protective technology solution. Indeed, P6 did not 
recall PbD being front and centre in the initial conversations of the TTC 
with the Commissioner: “I did not recall that notion ever directly coming 
up, but it comes up indirectly. During the investigation, the answer is 
no”. The TTC’s focus was on the complaint and the investigation: “When 
you look at 2007, [the TTC was] already into the investigation and you 
have the requirements imposed on [the TTC]. And therefore [the TTC 
doesn’t] have a say, [it has to] meet the requirements”. However, at the 
later stage, with the involvement of the research, policy, and special 
projects department, the TTC was more receptive to PbD. According 
to P6: “When [the TTC], prior to implementation, [went] back to the 
regulators to sit with them, and work with them about what [the TTC 
will do] with privacy by design, [it] has much more attractiveness and 
why you get a far greater buy in”. 
5. The Overall Role of the Regulator
It was easier for the TTC and the OLG to approach the Privacy 
Commissioner given that the Commissioner at the time was Dr. 
Cavoukian who had (and continues to have) an unusually high public 
profile and a reputation for both forcefully advocating for privacy and 
strongly supporting organizations as they seek privacy-friendly solutions. 
P1 described the former Commissioner in the following terms: “It 
was Ann’s openness to new solutions, and not immediately saying you 
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can’t do that. And our openness to, you might have to do it differently, 
but we can get there”. And P2 was impressed by the Commissioner’s 
advocacy: “nobody would have thought that the information and privacy 
commissioner would be giving a talk at a gaming conference. And she 
did”. Still P2 noted that the OLG approached the Commissioner with 
some trepidation: “there was a fear … because you’re actually exposing 
the organization to the privacy commissioner … internally people were 
concerned”.
P3 described the Commissioner’s approach as follows: 
[The commissioner] developed the policy with 3 c’s which was communication, 
co-operation, consultation. If you talked to [the commissioner] before the fact 
of whatever may have happened, then [they would] work with you behind the 
scenes, [not] trying to get any notoriety out of this. [The commissioner] wants 
solutions that work and wants to help you. You take all the credit.
Part of the Commissioner’s advocacy was to change the internal thinking 
about privacy. P3 mentioned that the Commissioner had a presentation 
which said, “great privacy is a business issue, not a compliance issue, 
and a competitive advantage. Conflict with the regulator is a zero-sum 
approach”. 
P5 also felt that the Commissioner played a positive role: 
I think without Ann’s passion for this, this never would have happened. I 
can guarantee you that. I would not have thought of even doing this. So, I 
would say that her passion for that, and the fact that she really you know, was 
adamant that we look at these things from a privacy lens very strongly, I think 
that that really helped. I think that the privacy commissioner’s office really kept 
us on track. Kept the entire project, the program on track. OLG was a willing 
participant in it for sure, we all, we all wanted to make sure we did what was 
best for the public good, but I think that you needed that guidance for sure, 
it was key.
At the TTC, the overall relationship with the Privacy Commissioner 
had a different tone since the attempt to design privacy into the TTC’s 
cameras was done alongside a formal investigation of a complaint about 
the TTC and its practices. While little was said by participants about the 
investigation itself, it seems that there were several barriers to adopting a 
PbD solution into TTC’s video surveillance expansion, including the fact 
that the TTC did not come willingly to PbD adoption but that it was 
imposed through the investigation (P6 interview). 
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Still, the interaction with the regulator caused the TTC to formulate 
its need for surveillance cameras that would not have come about 
otherwise. States P6: 
The TTC said we want the regulator on board, we want to make sure what 
we’re saying is perfect, and we want to work with [the regulator]. [The 
regulator] said, well you know, what we really want to know is have you looked 
at other less intrusive technologies, and what’s the primary purpose, which 
is a problem to answer because every group has a different answer. So [the 
regulator] really just sent [the TTC] back, saying, this is what we want to see 
in the business case, show us that you’ve looked at all the other privacy [more 
protective options], and show me why they’re not [possible], and then tell me 
how your system [will comply].
Finally, for P1, the role of the privacy regulator in contemporary society 
is different from the role of other regulators: 
Here’s the thing though, where I think privacy is unique right now, there’s such 
a proliferation of tools, to get into somebody’s information. I think by virtue 
of the environment, there is a stronger need for the regulator to have much 
more proactive foresight on where to get ahead of this, and also to be working 
collaboratively with insight on how to design. I don’t think any legislative 
regulator in the area of privacy and information in what is now, basically, a 
data-driven analytics age, can be resting on their historical way.
To that P3 added: 
[The commissioner’s role is] not a traditional role.  Perhaps because [Cavoukian 
was] not a lawyer, it was easy for her to look at it as not a lawyer. [Cavoukian] 
loved the design aspect, let’s design things in a way that can avoid the need to 
engage the regulators wrath, which is usually what you’re getting at the end. 
6. Theme Summary
The sum of the findings related to the regulator theme is that the 
personal role that Ann Cavoukian played in the implementation of PbD 
is inseparable from the formal regulatory role that her office played. It 
is clear that regulatory support early-on was crucial for the success of 
PbD and also that the formal regulatory relationship, in the form of an 
investigation, was, in fact, counter-productive and did not lead to the 
success of PbD. Broadly speaking, it seems that a collaborative regulatory 
model is preferable to a model which focuses on the enforcement of the 
relevant privacy law and that an informal relationship, such as the one 
that is created when the Privacy Commissioner is perceived not to be the 
33(2018) 4 CJCCL
main regulator, is preferable to a more formal one for such initiatives to 
succeed.
V. Conclusions 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the findings of this research project 
with respect to engineering privacy, privacy as an organizational function, 
and finally with respect to regulating PbD.
A. Privacy as an Engineering Problem
Privacy continues to be an engineering problem. Ten years ago, in both 
initiatives, the first and foremost challenge was to engineer a technological 
solution that would reflect in a meaningful way the principles of PbD. In 
both initiatives, engineers at all levels of the project noted their inability 
to use the principles of PbD in a way that would help them in their work.
At the TTC, the initiative did not proceed beyond some preliminary 
testing. The findings show that the TTC did not find the biometric 
encryption technology useful. This was a straightforward conclusion 
that, in fact, had little to do with PbD. Simply put, the technology did 
not work in the manner that the TTC had hoped for, or in a manner 
that at least would garner support for the continuation of the initiative. 
During the limited pilot, PbD and its principles were of limited use 
to the researchers and engineers as they attempted to incorporate the 
privacy enhancing technology into the TTC’s systems. PbD could not 
offer, therefore, professional guidance, the equivalent of an engineering 
manual, to the researchers working on the initiative and could not 
point them in the direction of a successful solution. PbD was of little 
practical use and due to the overwhelming lack of organizational support 
for the initiative within the TTC, could not even play a motivational, 
inspirational, or ideological role.
At the OLG, with all of the senior leadership support and with all of 
the regulatory support, the initiative came close to failure because of the 
difficulty of engineering PbD. In a sense, as revealed in the findings, the 
original initiative did fail, and it became apparent that it was necessary to 
reconfigure the project to allow for some form of integration of biometric 
encryption into the facial recognition systems that the OLG was preparing 
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to deploy. From the initial hope (and perhaps, to this day, widespread 
public misperception) that PbD would protect the information of all 
visitors to the OLG gambling sites by encrypting their images,55 and in 
so doing would mitigate the risks of such information being shared with 
others for a variety of secondary, unapproved purposes, the OLG initiative 
changed to deploy biometric encryption in order to enhance the security 
of its self-excluded patron database. The images of such patrons are used, 
in other words, as an encryption key that unlocks the database upon the 
entry of a self-excluded patron into an OLG gambling site. 
The OLG initiative can hardly be said, therefore, to diminish 
surveillance or the use of CCTV or the use of facial recognition 
technology. However, the OLG initiative does demonstrate the successful 
incorporation of privacy enhancing technology into its image processing 
and databases. The question remains whether the initiative was an example 
of the successful application of PbD principles to a technological problem 
and whether we can conclude that PbD principles provided guidance 
to the OLG’s engineers as they attempted to incorporate biometric 
encryption into their systems. The findings unfortunately indicate that 
we cannot and that the PbD principles were mapped onto the work done 
by engineers after the fact and with some difficulty. At best, PbD inspired 
all those working on the initiative to indeed find a way to design privacy 
protection into it. The importance of PbD as a motivating factor and 
driving force is, therefore, an important conclusion, yet at the same time 
it underscores the important realization that the principles of PbD offer 
little practical guidance to engineers.
55. One of the very first paragraphs of the report on the OLG initiative, 
IPCO, “Privacy-Protective Facial Recognition”, supra note 50 states 
“the increased use of facial recognition technology raises a number of 
privacy and security concerns. Given their mutual interest in respecting 
the privacy of all casino patrons, the IPC and OLG agreed that the 
application of an emerging Privacy-Enhancing Technology — Biometric 
Encryption (BE) — to a facial recognition system at an OLG casino 
would be an ideal ‘win-win’ project” at 1. See also IPCO, “Privacy-
Protective Facial Recognition”, supra note 50 at 14. 
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B. Privacy, Organizational Change, and Leadership
Against the backdrop of difficulty in implementing PbD in a technical, 
engineering sense, there is a growing sense that the value of PbD lies more 
in its ability to bring about organizational change and serve as an effective 
leadership tool. The findings allow for a discussion of the importance of 
regulatory leadership as well, which is discussed in the following section.
The two initiatives present radically different, almost diametrically 
opposed, organizational approaches.56 At the TTC, it is clear that there 
was little appetite for organizational change. Leadership viewed the PbD 
initiative as a regulatory imposition that was foisted upon the organization 
as a result of an external complaint. Indeed, it seems that the organization 
was at a loss understanding why a formal investigation against it was 
launched when, from an organizational perspective, existing systems and 
policies were reviewed and vetted by the IPC. From the outset, therefore, 
the TTC appeared to be in organizational opposition to any attempt to 
enhance or design privacy into its systems, possibly because that would 
be tantamount to admitting that the systems needed to be enhanced and 
were, therefore, lacking in some way and that the complaint against it 
would somehow, as a result, be perceived as justified.
Adding to the organizational reticence was the formal complaint 
process and the formal relationship that it created between the TTC and 
the IPC. As an organization, the TTC appeared content to remain within 
the confines of the complaint process and not venture beyond. Since 
the exploration of privacy enhancing technology was formally one of the 
recommendations of the IPC’s investigatory report, the TTC dealt with 
it formally, and perhaps with minimal effort, in order to ensure it was in 
compliance with the report but not really out of a compelling interest 
in privacy. PbD was perceived not as a motivating ideology but as an 
imposition.
56. This point is strengthened by the recognition that both initiatives 
appeared to benefit from similar organizational resources. The TTC, for 
instance, provided access to its subway stations and other facilities in order 
to provide researchers the ability to evaluate their PbD technology for the 
duration of the initiative.
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At the TTC, there was no push at the time to introduce new, 
potentially invasive, potentially surveilling, technology. The organization 
had its priorities set out in terms of improving service levels, increasing 
and maintaining ridership levels, improving customer experiences, 
maintaining costs, etc. It was focused on its core mandate of providing 
transit services, and as a result, leadership viewed the investigation, 
report, and pilot project as unwelcome distractions. In this organizational 
environment, there was little room for PbD to take hold, let alone serve 
as a useful tool for leadership.
In contrast, the approach of the OLG to PbD was strategic and 
calculated in order to ensure regulatory support for the organization’s 
initiative to modernize its self-exclusion program. Leadership of the 
OLG, at its most senior levels, was committed to support the integration 
of privacy with the facial recognition technology it was interested in. The 
findings indicate that the OLG leadership recognized the value of privacy 
not only strategically, in its dealing with the IPC, but also as a genuine 
value of public policy. As such, the protection of privacy fitted other 
values that the OLG aspired to associate with, such as organizational 
social responsibility in the context of responsible gaming.
The organizational adoption of PbD was easier at the OLG for two 
additional reasons. First, the OLG was not caught up in an investigation 
and was not the subject of a complaint to the IPC. The OLG was, 
therefore, not constrained by a formal relationship or concerned with 
the implications any of its actions may have with respect to an ongoing 
investigation. Second, the IPC was not the primary regulator of the 
OLG, allowing for a free and more informal relationship between the 
two entities. It is clear from the findings that the OLG is very careful 
in its relationship with its primary regulator, the AGCO, and that the 
regulatory guidance of the AGCO is quite detailed at times. It is telling 
that the OLG perceived the IPC and PbD as the opposite, and this further 
supports the conclusion that the power of PbD is not to be found in 
detailed technical guidance but rather in its ability to increase awareness 
and motivate organizations to think about privacy from the outset.
Once the leadership of the OLG endorsed privacy and endorsed 
PbD as the approach that should be taken with respect to its facial 
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recognition initiative, it was able to instill within its engineers working 
on the project the necessity of taking privacy into consideration and of 
collaborating openly with the IPC on a privacy enhancing solution. The 
IPC was perceived not so much as a dreaded regulator but rather as a 
subject-matter expert brought in to assist on the incorporation of privacy 
and on the understanding of PbD. This open relationship enabled close 
collaboration (of which adherents of a more formal regulatory role may be 
critical — see the following section) and ultimately allowed for the OLG 
to change the manner in which biometric encryption was integrated into 
its systems with the approval of the IPC.
The internal organizational result, as evidenced by the findings, has 
been an increase in the role and significance of privacy throughout the 
OLG from a more formal, limited, compliance role to a more pervasive, 
cultural, strategic role. Participants became more familiar and comfortable 
with PbD and its principles (such as purpose specification), the privacy 
office has increased in its resources and organizational importance, and 
privacy impact assessments are no longer a novelty. All of this occurred, 
notwithstanding the difficulties that the OLG’s engineers had with the 
actual implementation of PbD’s principles into their processes. This 
result strengthens the overall conclusion that the importance of PbD can 
be found in its ability to effect change, to inspire and to motivate, rather 
than in its ability to provide detailed guidance on how privacy is to be 
designed into a specific, given project. Of course, such conclusions have 
implications with respect to the ideal regulatory role in enforcing PbD 
once it becomes legally required.
C. PbD as a Regulatory Tool
As noted in the second section of this paper, Article 25 of the GDPR (that 
section of the new EU legislation where PbD is introduced into law) 
states that organizations will have to “implement appropriate technical 
and organisational measures … which are designed to implement data-
protection principles … , in an effective manner and to integrate the 
necessary safeguards into [data] processing”.57 The Article also states that 
57. GDPR, supra note 1, art 25(1).
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in so doing, organizations must take several factors into account: 
the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context 
and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity 
for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing.58
Finally, the Article states that organizations will be able to demonstrate 
compliance through certification. As envisioned in the GDPR, 
certification will be a voluntary process undertaken by organizations, and 
certificates and seals will be issued by certifying bodies that are, in turn, 
accredited by the relevant data protection authorities.59
Several important points emerge from the language used in the 
GDPR with respect to PbD. First, PbD is not understood exclusively as 
a technical or engineering tool. It is just as equally an organizational tool 
that can be used to bring about organizational measures and changes that 
will better protect privacy. The findings discussed above, and in particular 
the immediate conclusion above with respect to the ability of PbD to 
bring about organizational change, support Article 25 to that extent.
Second, Article 25 recognizes that PbD is an exercise that will vary 
greatly from one set of circumstances to the next and that in order to 
succeed as a regulatory instrument, PbD will have to take into account 
the factors listed in Article 25. This language indicates that a heavy-
handed, one-size-fits-all regulatory approach is not to be expected in the 
EU with respect to PbD and that organizations will be given considerable 
flexibility. Unfettered flexibility does raise concerns, of course, as to 
whether PbD will end up as a watered-down idea that will not bring 
about meaningful regulatory change. Yet, at the same time, this case 
study does indicate that flexibility, and in particular regulatory flexibility 
with respect to the implementation of PbD, is necessary if the idea is at 
all to succeed.
This flexibility is discussed further immediately below, but even prior 
to that discussion, it is worth noting how different the regulatory paths 
of the two initiatives were, despite apparent similarities. The OLG and 
the TTC both explored very similar intrusive technology, and both were 
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid, art 42–43.
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subject to the same legal framework surrounding personal information in 
Ontario. However, these similarities only serve to emphasize the different 
outcomes of each initiative. As discussed above, the initiatives ended 
differently largely due to the degree of internal organizational support 
each initiative enjoyed but (and perhaps more importantly for the present 
discussion and for the more general discussion attempting to determine 
how PbD will fare when it is mandated by law) also due to the role of the 
regulator in each initiative.
Throughout the TTC initiative, the regulator was constrained 
by the formal investigation and could not collaborate with the TTC 
to push for the success of PbD. With the OLG, however, due to the 
combination of not being the main regulator of the OLG as well as not 
formally investigating the OLG, the IPC was able to actively collaborate 
and demonstrate considerable flexibility. From a PbD initiative, which 
was presented to the public and perceived as an initiative in which 
privacy would be designed into surveillance cameras using innovative 
bio-encryption technology so that all individuals walking into an OLG 
gambling facility would have their privacy protected (through the 
encryption of their image), the project changed in scope to provide, in 
the end, for the protection of the personal information of self-excluded 
patrons in the OLG database by encrypting it with their image. While 
a noteworthy and laudable achievement, the final outcome of the OLG 
initiative is a far cry from its original formulation. It is clear from the 
findings that it would not have developed in such a manner were it 
not for the approval of the IPC and (then) Commissioner Cavoukian 
specifically.
Information gathered during the interviews conducted for this project 
was not sufficient to determine conclusively why such a change took 
place. Was it so that the OLG could simply proceed uninterrupted in the 
modernization of its self-exclusion program? Was it so that the OLG and 
the IPC could showcase a model of regulated-regulator interaction? Was 
it so that the IPC could tout PbD as a workable and not only aspirational 
idea? Was it to demonstrate the benefits of bio-encryption as a specific 
form of privacy enhancing technology? In all likelihood, the answer is a 
mix of all of the above. Does that indicate that Cavoukian cared more 
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about demonstrating the success of bio-encryption and of PbD than 
she did about the protection of everyone that would walk into a casino? 
Although Cavoukian has been forcefully criticized for her 3C approach 
and her pragmatism in the past,60 such a conclusion seems unduly harsh.
A more positive evaluation of Cavoukian and the IPC’s role would 
take into account her creation of a research, policy, and special projects 
department, the substantial support her office gave to the two initiatives 
through this special department, and her regulatory flexibility, all as 
much-desired regulatory traits. The findings can be further used to argue 
the point that neither initiative would have enjoyed the same level of 
support under another commissioner. Indeed, no other regulatory office 
in Canada has supported PbD initiatives in a similar manner, and the 
research, policy, and special projects department no longer exists at the 
IPC.
Regulatory determination, even rigidity, is no doubt quite often 
necessary and required, and the IPC, including under Cavoukian, certainly 
has shown its ability to enforce the law and exercise its order-making 
powers under Ontario’s provincial legislation. The question of this case 
study is, however, whether PbD will be better achieved through a rigid 
or flexible approach. In the United States, for example, the introduction 
of PbD led scholars to call on the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
to combine some regulatory firmness (“enforcement threats”) with the 
cultivation of “entrepreneurial privacy [advocacy]” and in so doing to 
“[avoid] both the shortcomings of static, top-down, command-and-
control regulatory approaches and the ways in which reliance on bottom-
up self-regulation alone can subvert public goals by private interests”.61 
It is certainly understandable why the IPC and Cavoukian would want 
to demonstrate flexibility with respect to PbD at a time that it was not 
explicitly part of the governing law but rather an approach that the IPC 
60. Ian Kerr, “Dreamin Man: The Role of Idealism and Pragmatisms in 
Privacy Advocacy” Ian Kerr (23 July 2008), online: Ian Kerr <www.
iankerr.ca/blog/2016/6/21/dreamin-man-the-role-of-idealism-and-
pragmatisms-in-privacy-advocacy>.
61. Kenneth Bamberger & Deirdre Mulligan, “Privacy on the Books and on 
the Ground” (2011) 63:2 Stanford Law Review 247 at 313.
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encouraged organizations to take with respect to compliance.
More generally (and to the extent that the case study can be 
generalized), it appears that a rigid approach to the implementation of 
PbD would be counter-productive given the ambiguity surrounding 
many of the operational details that have been developed, or have been 
attempted to develop, with respect to PbD over the years. PbD has always 
been most impactful as a guiding principle, emphasizing the importance 
of privacy and elevating privacy to the level of other organizational goals 
by stressing that it should be included in every organizational initiative 
related to personal information. The TTC and the OLG initiatives show 
us (in addition to academic literature on this point) that mapping PbD 
onto engineering, solution, and design algorithms is incredibly difficult. 
Some flexibility is, therefore, almost essential given the present state of 
PbD.
It may be that, somewhat intuitively, Cavoukian adopted a flexible 
regulatory approach that both fits PbD and appears to be advocated for 
increasingly by scholars studying the data protection authority model 
and its efficacy over the years. Researchers that examine information 
systems have argued that PbD will only succeed if it is applied as part of 
a contextual approach rather than by attempting to quantify privacy.62 
Scholars have called, for example (and specifically with respect to PbD), 
for an innovative regulatory framework that will allow, if not encourage, 
experimentation with new technological and engineering solutions and 
that will facilitate agreements between organizations and regulators that 
are the product of discussion and negotiation.63 On both counts, that is 
very similar to the conduct of the IPC in this case study.
D. The Future of PbD
How will PbD flourish now that it is about to become law in one of the 
largest jurisdictions in the world? This case study instructs us that it is 
probably not possible to develop a uniform mapping of PbD principles 
onto engineering and solution design. The two initiatives demonstrate just 
62. Davies & Langheinrich, “Privacy by Design”, supra note 53.
63. Rubinstein, “Regulating Privacy by Design”, supra note 18.
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how difficult it was to achieve even partial success in the implementation 
of PbD under what could be seen as almost ideal circumstances, of an 
encouraging and supportive regulator and enthusiastic (at least in the 
case of the OLG) organizational response. The difficulties, if not outright 
failure, of coherently engineering PbD point not only at the weakness of 
the concept but at its strength. PbD is best realized as a rallying call for 
privacy, as a change and leadership tool that can be used internally in an 
organization but also externally by the regulator.
How should European and other regulators approach PbD therefore? 
It seems from the case study that a mix of rigidity and flexibility is 
required. Rigidity is required with respect to insistence on the principle 
itself — that privacy must be and become a priority, that initiatives are 
not to proceed without privacy in mind, that privacy must be the default 
(in the language of Article 25). All of these should not be subject to 
compromise and negotiation between the regulator and regulated. Yet at 
the same time, the case study instructs us that regulatory flexibility with 
respect to the implementation of PbD in specific initiatives is absolutely 
required. PbD will fail if regulators develop and insist upon a uniform 
approach to its application.   
It is likely that certification will play a significant role in the creation 
of this regulatory flexibility, not because of the substantive standards of 
certification, which could be quite detailed and quantitative, but simply 
by virtue of introducing intermediaries in between the regulator and the 
regulated. In a sense, regulatory rigidity as it relates to the details of what 
it means, organizationally to design privacy, will be outsourced to the 
certifying bodies, allowing the supervising (data protection) authorities 
leeway in the determination of whether specific organizations and 
initiatives are in compliance with Article 25. Interestingly, Cavoukian, 
through her PbD Centre of Excellence at Ryerson University, and in 
partnership with the accounting firm Deloitte, is one of the first bodies 
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to offer such certification.64
Certification, and indeed the idea of PbD itself, can also be seen 
as carrots offered to organizations by law instead of a heavy regulatory 
stick. The regulator, according to this understanding, will step back 
and not micro-manage the protection of privacy by organizations, but 
in exchange, organizations must respond by changing internally and 
turning privacy into one of their leading values. And that, learning from 
the case study, is what appears to have happened at the OLG. The IPC let 
the OLG facial recognition proceed at a cost to the privacy of the many 
visitors to the OLG’s gambling sites but received the benefit of a changed 
organization that now has greater awareness to privacy and that willingly 
accepts the design of privacy into any future initiative.
The risks of such a regulatory “bargain” are clear yet may be 
unavoidable due to the limitations of PbD. Is the Ontario case study a 
red flag, a signal cautioning against determined regulatory flexibility at 
the expense of privacy protection? Or is it a demonstration, well ahead 
of its time, of a bold, new, and unconventional regulatory approach? 
Time will tell if this regulatory flexibility, this compromise of individual 
protection in consideration for organizational awareness and change, is 
the approach that regulators should take and whether designing privacy 
in such a manner will lead to the desired outcome that the GDPR, and 
similar regulatory frameworks, are intended to deliver: Privacy.
64. For some instructive details as to how Cavoukian certifies organizations, 
see Sylvia Kingsmill, “Privacy by Design Assessment and Certification” 
Deloitte (October 2017), online: Deloitte <www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/
pbdce/certification/Privacy-by-Design-Certification-Program-Assessment-
Methodology.pdf>.
44 
 
Levin,  Privacy by Design by Regulation
Appendix: Interview Questions
1. What is your professional background?
2. What is your current role, and what was your role in connection 
with the policy of “privacy by design” that we will discuss today?
3. Please tell me about this policy:
a. Who initiated the policy?
b. What was the motivation for the new policy?
c. What inspired this policy? (e.g. Ontario’s Privacy Commissioner; 
the “Jerusalem declaration” of the Privacy Commissioners from 
2010). What were the considerations underlying the policy and 
what is its purpose?
d. What was the decision-making process concerning the 
implementation of the policy? (who decided, who was consulted, 
what preliminary steps were taken, etc.)
e. What interaction did you have with the regulators? Was it direct 
(e.g. meetings, correspondence) or indirect? (e.g. reading reports)
f. Were the implications of the policy examined? How?
4. What was the underlying concept of privacy that this policy 
addressed? How was the policy intended to meet the privacy needs?
5. What was the concept that founded the regulation of technological 
activities by legal means? Did the ability to implement the policy 
depend on the technology you were addressing?
6. What was the role of engineers (e.g. computer), and were they part 
of the public or private sector in the implementation of the policy? 
How did engineers influence the outcome?
7. What role did having or being dictated a policy have in the internal 
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organizational discussion about privacy?
8. How is the policy implemented in practice? Are there difficulties in 
its implementation? What are they? Is the policy achieving its privacy 
and more general objectives?
